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Suffer the Little Children to Come: Legal Rights of Unaccompanied Alien 
Children under United States Federal Court Jurisprudence 
Abstract 
This article analyzes United States (‘U.S.’) federal court jurisprudence to determine the legal 
rights of unaccompanied alien children in various stages of immigration enforcement 
proceedings. After briefly discussing statistics on unaccompanied alien children in the U.S., it 
explains the legal context of U.S. laws governing unaccompanied minors. Through examining 36 
cases decided by the 12 U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, the article specifies how the federal 
courts interpreted and expanded on the legal rights of unaccompanied alien children upon 
apprehension by immigration officials, during placement or detention decisions of the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement, prior to voluntary departure, during asylum proceedings, when rearrested 
after release, and while released pending immigration proceedings. According to the U.S. federal 
courts, the government must grant unaccompanied alien children procedural due process if it 
denies their release to the custody of an available and willing legal custodian. Case law 
examining the rights of UAC prior to voluntary departure emphasize the need to grant them the 
opportunity to consult with a responsible adult, including a lawyer from a free legal services list 
that should be provided to them. Federal courts have also tackled issues concerning asylum 
claims filed by UAC. These include the right of third parties to custody of the unaccompanied 
minor, the minority age at the time of the asylum application, and the right of the UAC to request 
consent for a state juvenile court’s jurisdiction.  In removal proceedings against UAC, federal 
courts have elaborated on the scope and meaning of the right to counsel and the right to a bond 
rehearing upon their rearrest because of allegations of gang membership.  Finally, federal courts 
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have also examined issues concerning the rights of the unaccompanied alien child while detained 
in ORR facilities and while in U.S. territory  
1. Introduction 
The recent surge of unaccompanied alien children (‘UAC’) over the last few years has raised 
complex legal issues regarding how and when the UAC should be detained upon apprehension in 
the United States (‘U.S’.), who they should be released to, and what rights they should be 
accorded in immigration enforcement proceedings.
1
  These legal issues exist in the context of 
broader political debates ongoing in the U.S. over levels of immigration and possible large-scale 
reforms to U.S. immigration policy.
2
 In addition to the legal questions UAC present for U.S. 
immigration policy, they present significant ethical questions.
3
   
UAC are particularily vulnerable since by definition they are children, traveling alone 
and undocumented, into a country not their own.
4
  Many of these children are fleeing violence 
and extreme poverty in their home countries.
5
  Three primary source countries of UAC to the 
U.S—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—have high levels of extreme poverty and 
                                                           
1
Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and Thitima Puttitanun, ‘Undocumented Youth in Limbo: The Impact of America's 
Immigration Enforcement Policy on Juvenile Deportations’ (2018) 31 Journal of Population Economics 597; Claire 
Nolasco, ‘Models of legal representation for unaccompanied minors’ (2018) 54 Criminal Law Bulletin 274; Wendy 
Shea, ‘Almost there: Unaccompanied Alien Children, Immigration Reform, and a Meaningful Opportunity to 
Participate in the Immigration Process’ (2014) 18 UC Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy 148. 
2
Eliana Corona, ‘The Reception and Processing of Minors in the United States in Comparison to that of Australia 
and Canada: Would Being a Party to the UN Convention on the Right of the Child Make a Difference in U.S. 
Courts?’ (2017) 40 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 205; Rebeca G. Gil, ‘Running into the 
arms of expatriation: America's failure addressing the rights of unaccompanied migrant children from central 
America’ (2017) 32 Maryland Journal of International Law 346. 
3
Lilian Chavez and Cecilia Menjívar, ‘Children without Borders: A Mapping of the Literature on Unaccompanied 
Migrant Children to the United States’ (2010) 5 Migraciones Internacionales 71; Shani King, ‘Alone and 
Unrepresented: A Call to Congress to Provide Counsel for Unaccompanied Minors’ (2013) 50 Harvard Journal On 
Legislation 331. 
4
Shani King, ‘Alone and Unrepresented: A Call to Congress to Provide Counsel for Unaccompanied Minors’ (2013) 
50 Harvard Journal On Legislation 331; McKayla M. Smith, ‘Scared, But No Longer Alone: Using Louisiana to 
Build a Nationwide System of Representation for Unaccompanied Children’ (2017) 63 Loyola Law Review 111. 
5
Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and Thitima Puttitanun, ‘DACA and the Surge in Unaccompanied Minors at the US-
Mexico Border’ (2016) 54 International Migration 102; Serap Keles, Oddgeir Friborg, Thormod Idsoe, Selcuk Sirin, 
and Brit Oppedal, ‘Resilience and Acculturation Among Unaccompanied Refugee Minors’ (2018) 42 International 
Journal of Behavioral Development 52. 
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 and have a proliferation of international criminal gangs that target and victimize many 
UAC.
7
  Additionally, many UAC come to the U.S. seeking reunification with family members, 
mostly parents, who have emigrated earlier.
8
 These factors motivating UAC to leave their home 
country and enter the U.S. underlie the legal questions regarding how justice is given to UAC 
when they enter into the U.S. immigration system. The complexity of immigration proceedings, 
especially for a class of noncitizens who are vulnerable to the inherent coercive nature of the 
proceedings, necessitate an analysis of the legal issues surrounding UAC.
9
   
Before turning to the legal analysis however, we present some descriptive statistics on the 
recent number of UAC who have entered the U.S. and their source countries. Overall, the 
number of UAC entering the U.S. has grown.  Data from the Customs and Border Patrol (‘CBP’) 
and the Office of Refugee Resettlement (‘ORR’) documents the increase over the last few years.  
Figure 1. presents the number of UAC apprehended per fiscal year.  In 2010 and 2011 there were 
18,622 and 16,067 UAC apprehended respectively.  There was a significant increase for the next 
few years in 2012, 2013, and 2014 with 24,481, 38,833, and 68,631 UAC apprehended 
respectively.  The numbers decline in 2015 to 40,035 apprehended but increase to 59,757 in 2016 
and decline again in 2017 to 41,456 UAC apprehended.  Coinciding with the number of UAC 
who have been apprehended entering the U.S., the number of UAC referred to the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement has also increased.  Figure 1 presents referrals to ORR which is the agency 
                                                           
6
Julie Marzouk, ‘Ethical and Effective Representation of Unaccompanied Immigrant Minors in Domestic Violence-
Based Asylum Cases’ 2016) 22 Clinical Law Review 395; Cheryl B. Sawyer and Judith Márquez, ‘Senseless 
Violence Against Central American Unaccompanied Minors: Historical Background and Call For Help’ (2017) 151 
Journal of Psychology 69. 
7
William A. Kandel, Andorra Bruno, Peter J. Meyer, Clare R. Seelke, Maureen Taft-Morales, and Ruth E. Wasem, 
‘Unaccompanied Alien Children: Potential Factors Contributing to Recent Immigration’ (2014) Congressional 
Research Service <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43628.pdf> accessed 20 January 2018 
8
Marcela Sotomayor-Peterson and Martha Montiel-Carbajal, ‘Psychological and Family Well-Being of 
Unaccompanied Mexican Child Migrants Sent Back From the U.S. Border Region of Sonora-Arizona’ (2014) 36 
Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 111. 
9
Danuta Villarreal, ‘To Protect the Defenseless: The Need for Child-Specific Substantive Standards for 
Unaccompanied Minor Asylum-Seekers’ (2004) 26 Houston Journal of International Law 743. 
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responsible for detaining and sheltering UAC while they await their immigration hearing.  The 
highpoint in referrals was 2016 when 59,170 UAC were referred and the second highest was 
2014 when 57,496 were referred.  Finally, Figure 1 presents information for three years of ORR 
UAC sponsorship.  Sponsorship will be discussed in more detail below but overall it refers to the 
practice of ORR releasing a UAC to a family member or other qualified adult who is able to care 
for them.  In 2015 27,840 UAC were released to sponsors, in 2016 52,147 were released to 
sponsors, and in 2017 42, 416 were released to sponsors.   
Figure 1 Here 
Figure 2. presents information on the country of origin of UAC from FY 2012 to FY 
2017.  As the figure shows, the vast majority of UAC come from three countries in particular: El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.  From 2012 to 2017 the number of UAC from El Salvador 
gradually increased with 27 percent of the overall total to 34 percent of the overall total in 2016, 
although the number did drop back to 27 percent in 2017.  UAC from Guatemala also increased 
as a percentage of the overall total.  In 2012 UAC from Guatemala represented 34 percent of all 
UAC that year and by 2017 that number had increased to 45 percent.  Conversely, the number of 
UAC from Honduras has declined as a percentage of the overall total.  In 2012 UAC from 
Honduras represented 27 percent of the overall total but by 2017 that number had dropped to 23 
percent.  This small snapshot of the total number of UAC who have entered the U.S. and where 
they are coming from provides important background and context for the legal analysis that 
follows.   
Figure 2 Here 
 
1.1 Legal context of U.S. immigration laws on unaccompanied alien children 
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Prior to 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (‘INS’) of the Department of Justice 
(‘DOJ’) was responsible for the care and custody of UAC arrested in the U.S. who were 
suspected of being deportable and who had no responsible parent or legal guardian.
10
 The INS 
were also tasked with prosecuting removal proceedings against UAC in immigration courts. 
Over the past decade, an increased number of arrested UAC could not be released on bond or 




In response to the increased flow of UAC into California, the INS Western Regional 
Office adopted a policy of limiting the release of detained minors to ‘a parent or lawful 
guardian’, except in ‘unusual and extraordinary cases’ allowing release to ‘a responsible 
individual’ who agrees to provide for the care, welfare, and wellbeing of the child.
12
 Four UAC 
filed a class action in the District Court for the Central District of California on behalf of all 
aliens under the age of 18 detained by the INS Western Region because a parent or legal 
guardian failed ‘to personally appear to take custody of them’.
13
 Pending litigation, INS adopted 
a modified rule allowing alien juveniles to be released to a: (1) parent; (2) legal guardian; or (2) 
adult relative (e.g., brother, sister, aunt, uncle, grandparent), unless the INS determined that 
detention was necessary to ensure the UAC’s safety or appearance in deportation proceedings.
14
  
The district court in Reno v. Flores later approved a consent decree that settled all claims 
regarding UAC’s detention conditions (the ‘Flores Settlement’).
15
 The Flores Settlement 
                                                           
10
D.B. v. Cardall 826 F.3d 721 (4th Cir. 2016). 
11
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established a nationwide policy for the detention, release, and treatment of UAC.
16
 Among 
others, it: (1) defined a ‘minor’ as ‘any person under the age of eighteen (18) years detained in 
the legal custody of the INS; (2) supported ‘family reunification;’ (3) listed the preferred order of 
individuals to whom detained minors may be released; and, (4) provided for the custody and 
right to a bond hearing of minors who cannot be immediately released.
17
  
The Flores Settlement is binding on all successor agencies to the INS, including the 
Office of Refugee Resettlement (‘ORR’) of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(‘HHS’).
18
 The Flores Settlement provided that unless detention was necessary to ensure a 
child’s safety or his appearance in immigration court, he must be released without unnecessary 
delay to a parent or legal guardian.
19
 Juveniles who are not released must, within 72 hours of 
arrest, be placed in juvenile care facilities that ‘meet or exceed state licensing requirements for 
the provision of services to dependent children’.
20
 Studies indicate that the mental health of UAC 
depend on the degree of trauma and acculturation upon migration into the country of refuge.
21
 
Hence, the necessity of release and placement is essential to the wellbeing of the UAC.
22
 
Since the Flores Settlement, Congress enacted the 2002 Homeland Security Act (the 
                                                           
16
D.B. (n10); Flores v. Sessions 862 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2017); Elizabeth Lincoln, ‘The Fragile Victory for 
Unaccompanied Children’s Due Process Rights After Flores v. Sessions’ (2017) 45 Hastings Constitutional Law 
Quarterly 157. 
17




D.B. (n10); Lincoln (n16). 
20
Reno (n11) 292.  
21
Tammy. M. Bean, Elisabeth Eurelings-Bontekoe and Philip Spinhoven, ‘Course and Predictors of Mental Health 
of Unaccompanied Refugee Minors in the Netherlands: One Year Follow-Up’ (2007) 64 Social Science & Medicine 
1204; Israel Bronstein and Paul Montgomery, ‘Psychological Distress in Refugee Children: A Systematic Review’ 
(2011) 14 Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review 44; Tine K. Jensen, Envor M. Skårdalsmo, and Krister. W. 
Fjermestad, ‘Development of Mental Health Problems-A Follow-Up Study of Unaccompanied Refugee Minors’ 
(2014) 8 Child & Adolescent Psychiatry & Mental Health 1; Serap Keles, Oddgeir Friborg, Thormod Idsoe, Selcuk 
Sirin, and Brit Oppedal, ‘Resilience and Acculturation among Unaccompanied Refugee Minors’ (2018) 42 
International Journal of Behavioral Development 52; Johanna Unterhitzenberger, Rima Eberle-Sejari, Miriam 
Rassenhofer, Thorsten Sukale, Rita Rosner, and Lutz Goldbeck, ‘Trauma-Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy 
With Unaccompanied Refugee Minors: A Case Series’ (2015) 15 BMC Psychiatry 1. 
22
Keles (n21). 
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‘HSA’) and the 2008 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (the ‘TVPRA’) both of 
which affirmed the authority of the ORR over the care and placement of UAC.
23
 The HSA 
abolished the former INS and established the Department of Homeland Security (‘DHS’). The 
law also transferred the care of UAC from the former INS to the ORR.
24
  Under the HSA, a UAC 
is defined as an individual who: (1) has no lawful immigration status in the United States; (2) is 
under the age of eighteen; and, (3) must have either (a) ‘no parent or legal guardian in the United 
States’; or (b) ‘no parent or legal guardian in the United States ... available to provide care and 
physical custody’.
25
 The HSA required the ORR to ensure that ‘the best interests of the child’ are 
considered in decisions and actions concerning his or her care and custody.
26
 The HSA has a 
‘savings clause’ that recognizes as effective and valid all administrative actions (e.g., orders, 
agreements, grants, contracts, certificates, licenses, registrations, and privileges) entered into by 




In 2008, Congress adopted the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (the 
‘TVPRA’) which contained provisions relating to a UAC. Under the TVPRA, the HHS Secretary 
is responsible for the care, custody, and detention of a UAC.
28
 Other federal agencies holding a 
UAC were required to transfer custody to the ORR within 72 hours after determining that the 
minor is a UAC.
29
 Upon transfer to ORR custody, the ORR is required to promptly place the 
UAC in the ‘least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child’.
30
 The TVPRA, like 
the Flores Settlement, provides that if release is not possible, the UAC may be placed in a 
                                                           
23
Tabbaa v. Chertoff 509 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2007). 
24
6 U.S.C. § 279 (a), 2002 
25
D.B. (n10) 732-733. 
26






D.B. (n10); Flores (n16). 
30
ibid.  
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specialized juvenile program or facility if the ORR determines that he or she ‘poses a danger to 
self or others’ or committed a criminal offense.
31
 The ORR was also required under the law to 
conduct monthly reviews of any placement of a UAC in a secure facility.  
Under current ORR policies, field specialists initially determine whether to detain or 
release unaccompanied minors (‘ORR Policies’).
32
 Before placing the UAC with a potential 
custodian, the ORR must: (1) ascertain whether the proposed custodian can provide for the 
minor’s physical and mental well-being; and, (2) determine the necessity of a home study.
33
 A 
home study is mandatory when the proposed custodian ‘clearly presents a risk of abuse, 
maltreatment, exploitation, or trafficking to the child’.
34
 The parent or legal guardian (but not 
any other sponsor) has 30 days to appeal the adverse decision to the Assistant Secretary for 
Children and Families. Under ORR Policies, the parent or guardian does not have the right to be 
represented by counsel at the placement hearing.
35
 The UAC can appeal a detention decision 





The WESTLAW database contains electronic copies of all published and unpublished court 
decisions.  A keyword search was used to gather cases on unaccompanied alien children decided 
by all federal courts in the United States.  The advanced search parameters required that the 
terms ‘unaccompanied alien child’ appeared in the main body of the case (N=112).  The authors 




Office of Refugee Resettlement, ‘ORR Guide: Children Entering the United States Unaccompanied’ (January 30, 





ibid. 734.  
35
Flores (n16) 872. 
36
ibid. 
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then read each case individually and determined that not all cases were relevant to the article, 
either because the case did not involve unaccompanied alien children or did not contain 
sufficient facts to enable full analysis.  Also, some of the cases were repeated because of the 
appeal process through the federal courts.  The authors conducted an inductive doctrinal analysis 
to synthesize thirty-six (36) federal court decisions on the legal rights of an unaccompanied alien 
child under current U.S. laws.
37
 
3. Case Analysis 
3.1 Issues concerning release or detention  
3.1.1 Right to be released to a private custodian  
In Reno v. Flores¸the U. S. Supreme Court considered whether a detained UAC who does not 
have any available parent, close relative, or legal guardian has the right to be released to the 
custody of any other ‘willing-and-able private custodian’ instead of being confined to a 
‘government-operated or government-selected child-care institution’.
38
 The Court examined 
whether a UAC has a fundamental constitutional right ‘not to be placed in a decent and humane 
custodial institution’ if there is a responsible adult willing to accept ‘temporary legal custody’ 
but not willing to be the child’s legal guardian
39
 The Court held that the INS regulations 
permitting release of a UAC only to his or her parents, close relatives, or legal guardians did not 
‘facially violate substantive due process’.
40
 As long as the government’s intent is not punitive 
and custodial conditions are ‘decent and humane’, governmental custody of a juvenile who does 
not have any available parent, close relative, or legal guardian does not violate the Constitution.
41
 
                                                           
37
Claire Nolasco, Michael S. Vaughn, and Rolando del Carmen, ‘Toward a new methodology for legal research in 
criminal justice’ (2010) 21 Journal of Criminal Justice Education’ 1–23. 
38
Reno (n11) 302. 
39
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The custody is rationally related to the government’s interest in ‘preserving and promoting the 
welfare of the child’.
42
 
  The Court acknowledged the authority of Congress to detain aliens suspected of entering 
the country illegally pending their deportation hearings.
43
 The INS regulations are rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental purpose, namely, concern for the juvenile’s welfare who 
cannot be released to ‘just any adult’ and the State’s lack of expertise and resources to conduct 
home studies for placement of every UAC.
44
 When the UAC’s parent, close relative, or state-
appointed guardian is not available, INS retains legal custody by placing the UAC in a 
‘government-supervised and state-licensed shelter-care facility’.
45
 The Court concluded that the 
INS can justify its policy of retaining custody because its regulations do not involve a 
deprivation of a fundamental right. The INS cannot be compelled to grant custody to strangers if 
that option requires substantial administrative effort and costs that it is unwilling to expend. 
Finally, the Court noted that INS custody of a UAC is not indefinite but is inherently limited to 
the duration of the deportation hearing.
46
 There was ‘no evidence’ that alien juveniles are held 
for ‘undue periods’ and that ‘(i)t is expected that alien juveniles will remain in INS custody an 
average of only 30 days’.
47
  
3.1.2 Right to due process in custody and placement decisions 
The Fourth Circuit considered the nature and extent of a UAC’s due process rights in placement 
decisions in two related cases of D.B. v. Cardall
48
 and Beltran v. Cardall.
49
 In D.B. v. Cardall, 
the issue was whether the ORR had continued authority to detain a UAC when deportation 
                                                           
42
Reno (n11) 303; Santosky v. Kramer 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982). 
43
Carlson v. Landon 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952). 
44










Beltran v. Cardall 222 F.Supp.3d 476 (E.D. Virginia 2016). 
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proceedings are terminated.  The case involved a Guatemalan citizen who illegally entered the 
United States with her four children, including R.M.B. who was then six years old.  When the 
mother became a lawful permanent resident under the Violence Against Women Act (the 
‘VAWA’), the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (the ‘USCIS’) granted deferred action 
to R.M.B. as a derivative beneficiary of his mother’s VAWA petition. While attempting to 
smuggle undocumented immigrants near the Mexican-McAllen, Texas border, R.M.B. was 
arrested by Border Patrol agents and transferred to ORR custody, pending removal proceedings 
against him. The mother submitted a family reunification request to the ORR, asking for 
R.M.B.’s release to her custody. The ORR denied the request based on a home study 
recommending against release due to R.M.B.’s criminal history and high risk of recidivism.
50
 
The immigration judge terminated the removal proceedings against R.M.B. because he had 
already been granted deferred action.
51
 
 The Fourth Circuit held that R.M.B. is a UAC based on the ORR’s assessment that his 
mother was incapable of providing for his physical and mental well-being.
52
 The authority of 
ORR to detain R.M.B. did not cease upon termination of removal proceedings against him 
because ORR was specifically required by law to determine whether a proposed custodian can 
provide for the UAC’s physical and mental well-being (the ‘suitable custodian requirement’).
53
 
The Fourth Circuit held that the suitable custodian requirement is an exception to the general rule 
that an alien cannot be detained upon termination of immigration proceedings against him.
54
  
According to the Fourth Circuit, the case involved ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests’, specifically, the fundamental right of parents to provide ‘care, custody, and 
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control of their children’
55
 and the rights of children to be ‘raised and nurtured’ by their 
parents.
56
 The Fourth Circuit remanded the case, requiring the district court to apply the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s procedural due process standard in Mathews v. Eldridge
57
 (the ‘Mathews 
test’).
58
 The Mathews test requires an analysis of: (1) the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; (2) the ‘risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest’ through the 
procedures used, and the ‘probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards;’ and, (3) the Government's interest and the ‘fiscal and administrative burdens’ that 
‘additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail’.
59
  
On remand, the district court in Beltran v. Cardall, concluded that the ORR’s family 
reunification procedures did not provide R.M.B and petitioner due process of law based on the 
Mathews test.
60
 The district ordered R.M.B.’s release to care and custody of his mother and held 
that: (1) mother and child had a fundamental liberty interest in family integrity, which was 
protected by procedural due process; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of petitioner’s 
fundamental liberty interests required ORR to ensure due process in its procedures for family 
reunification; and (3) the governmental interest involved was not sufficient to rule that ORR was 
not required to implement additional measures to guaranty procedural due process.  
The district court stated that the petitioner’s right to the care and custody of her son and 
R.M.B.’s reciprocal right to his mother’s care is ‘deserving of the greatest solicitude’.
61
 The 
‘private fundamental liberty interest’ in retaining custody of one’s children is an ‘essential, basic 
                                                           
55
Beltran (n49) 481; D.B. (n10) 740; Troxel v. Granville 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
56
Beltran (n49) 482; Berman v. Young 291 F.3d 976, 983 (7th Cir. 2002); D.B. (n10) 740. 
57
Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
58




Beltran (n49).   
61
Beltran (n49) 482; Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson 15 F.3d 333, 345-346 (4th Cir. 1994). 
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civil right of man…far more precious than property rights’.
62
 Also, ‘[t]he forced separation of 
parent from child, even for a short time, represents a serious impingement on’ the right to family 
integrity.
63
 Here, petitioner and R.M.B. were separated for nearly three years. While in the 
custody of the ORR, R.M.B. was held in juvenile detention facilities, the most restrictive 
placement. As a result, the mother has been deprived of ‘meaningful contact with her son’.
64
  
The district court then examined the adequacy of ORR procedures for placement of UAC 
with suitable custodians.
65
 Here, the ORR ordered a home study upon submission of the family 
reunification form by the mother. The home study recommended against releasing R.M.B. to 
petitioner’s care because of R.M.B.’s behavioral problems instead of the mother’s parental 
fitness.
66
 A month after the home study, petitioner received a short letter stating that her request 
was denied because R.M.B. required an environment with a ‘high level of supervision and 
structure’.
67
 The district court concluded that the ORR process was deficient because the 
proceedings were unilateral and petitioner was not informed of the evidence or the facts relied 
upon. Under Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent, the state has the ‘burden to initiate 
proceedings to justify its action’ once it withholds a child from a parent’s care.
68
 Adversarial 
hearings are required when ‘subjective judgments’ that are ‘peculiarly susceptible to error’ are 
disputed.
69
 The determination of whether a proposed custodian can provide for a UAC’s physical 
and mental well-being is a ‘complex and subjective inquiry’.
70
 The court concluded that ORR 
deprived petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to present her case because it made the 
                                                           
62
Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. for City of Baltimore 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 
1990). 
63
Jordan (n61) 345. 
64




Beltran (n49) 484. 
67
Beltran (n49) 485. 
68
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subjective judgment without ‘any form of hearing’.
71
 All the procedures of the ORR for 
placement consisted of ‘internal evaluation and unilateral investigation’.
72
 The ORR’s deficient 
procedures ‘created a significant risk’ that petitioner and R.M.B. would be ‘erroneously deprived 
of their right to family integrity’.
73
 
  In Santos v. Smith, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia 
also applied the Mathews test in determining whether a UAC was deprived of due process when 
the ORR denied his mother’s request for relase to her custody.
74
 In this case, Santos fled 
Honduras when O.G.L.S. was five years old to escape physical abuse from her husband. When 
he was 14 years old, O.G.L.S. fled Honduras and entered the United States to be reunited with 
his mother. He was apprehended, determined to be a UAC, and transferred to ORR custody. 
After O.G.L.S. disclosed his participation in criminal gang activities, ORR placed him at the 
Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center (‘SVJC’), a secure facility in Staunton, Virginia. The mother 
filed a petition with ORR asking to be reunified with her son. ORR conducted a home study 
which recommended reunification, specifically noting that ‘Ms. Santos [and her husband] will be 
positive influences on the minor, and that he should be released to their care’.
75
 The ORR issued 
a decision more than 14 months after the home study was completed and denied the application 
for family reunification. The mother filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that ORR 
violated her due process rights and sought O.G.L.S.’s immediate release to her custody.  
The district court held that the detention of O.G.L.S. for more than 29 months violated 
procedural due process and ordered his immediate release to the custody of Santos. The district 
court stated that due process consists of ‘notice and the opportunity to be heard’ at a 








Santos v. Smith 260 F.Supp.3d 598 (W. D. Virginia 2017). 
75
ibid. 602. 
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‘meaningful’ time and manner.
76
 Applying the first factor in the Mathews test, the court stated 
that the private interests impacted both the fundamental right of petitioners to family 
reunification and O.G.L.S.’s right to liberty.
77
 The court opined that ‘a more fulsome process’ 




The court identified key deficiencies in the ORR process. First, the ORR did not 
adequately explain the reasons for its decision. Second, the ORR process ‘improperly placed the 
burden of initiation and persuasion on the petitioner’.
79
 The burden should be on ORR to show 
the necessity of continued custody of the UAC rather than on the parent to show the propriety of 
release.
80
 Third, there were ‘very lengthy delays’ in the ORR’s processing of the petition for 
reunification.
81
  The ‘egregious’ 17-months delay before the ORR decided on the initial 
application for reunification violated due process.
82
 The court also noted that because of this 
delay, O.G.L.S.’s psychological condition worsened while in placement. Fourth, no hearing was 
conducted before an impartial judge.  
3.1.3 Right to the bond hearing of the Flores settlement 
In Flores v. Sessions, the Ninth Circuit considered whether subsequent statutes revoked the 
Flores Settlement, including paragraph 24A which grants every minor in deportation 
proceedings the right to a bond redetermination hearing before an immigration judge ‘unless the 
minor indicates on the Notice of Custody Determination form that he or she refuses such a 
                                                           
76
Armstrong v. Manzo 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Santos (n74) 611. 
77




Santos (n74) 613. 
80
Addington v. Texas 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Foucha v. Louisiana 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Santos (n74); Thach v. 
Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs. 754 S.E.2d 922 (2014); United States v. Salerno 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
81
Santos (n74) 613. 
82
Santos (n74) 614. 
Page 15 of 34
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijrl



































































 Plaintiffs alleged that ORR currently detains UAC ‘for months, and even years’ 
without providing them any opportunity to challenge the basis for their detention before an 
independent immigration judge.
84
 The Ninth Circuit invoked the basic rules of statutory 
construction, noting that the plain texts of the HSA and TVPRA did not explicitly terminate the 
Flores Settlement’s bond-hearing requirement. The bond hearing under Paragraph 24A of the 
Flores Settlement is a fundamental protection for a UAC that does not automatically result in the 
setting of bail or release of the UAC.
85
 Even if the immigration judge decides that detention by 




Compared to ORR policies, the bond hearing requirement under the Flores Settlement 
provides ‘significant practical benefits to unaccompanied minors’.
87
 ORR policies do not 
guarantee a UAC the right to present evidence, the right to legal counsel, and does not ‘identify 
any standard of proof’ including evidentiary requirements.
88
 In contrast, bond hearings allow 
minors to be represented by legal counsel, provide oral statements, present supporting evidence, 
and is appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals.  The Flores Settlement grants minors an 
automatic bond hearing ‘unless affirmatively waived’ while the ORR review process ‘must be 
affirmatively invoked’.
89
 The Ninth Circuit pointed out that plaintiff’s experiences are a ‘strong 
indication’ that ORR’s current policies are ‘inadequate’ and that bond hearings ‘will provide a 
meaningful benefit to unaccompanied minors’.
90
  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Flores 
Settlement is binding on the government, ‘regardless of which agency may now be charged with 
                                                           
83
Flores (n16) 869. 
84




Flores (n16) 867. 
87
Flores (n16) 877. 
88
Flores (n16) 878. 
89
Flores (n16) 879. 
90
ibid. 
Page 16 of 34
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijrl

































































caring for unaccompanied minors.
91
  
3.2 Issues concerning voluntary departure 
3.2.1 Rights before signing a voluntary departure consent form 
Voluntary departure is a form of relief for a qualified alien who is apprehended by immigration 
officials.
92
 INS policies allow an alien to consent to summary removal from the United States at 
his or her expense upon signing a voluntary departure form (form I–274), waiving the right to a 
deportation hearing and all other forms of relief. INS policies on voluntary departure for UAC 
vary ‘according to the age, residence, and place of apprehension of the child’.
93
 For UAC aged 
fourteen to sixteen, the INS gathers information on the UAC through form I–213, notifies the 
UAC of the remedy of voluntary departure, and asks the child to indicate whether he or she opts 
for voluntary departure or a deportation hearing. For UAC who are permanent residents of 
Mexico and Canada and are arrested near the Mexican or Canadian borders, the INS temporarily 
detains the UAC until a foreign consulate official arrives. The UAC is then returned to his or her 
home country upon requesting voluntary departure.  
Plaintiff UAC aged 12 to 16 alleged that, upon apprehension, INS asked them to sign a 
voluntary departure consent form without advising them of their rights ‘in a meaningful 
manner’.
94
 They filed a class action on the ground that the INS violated their due process rights 
because they were forced to ‘unknowingly and involuntarily’ select voluntary departure and 
waive their rights to a deportation hearing or other forms of relief.
95
 The district court ruled in 
favor of plaintiffs and granted a permanent injuction. 
The District Court for the Central District of California applied the three-part test of 
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Mathews v. Eldridge to resolve the procedural due process issue: (1) the private interest affected; 
(2) the ‘risk of erroneous deprivations of rights’ under the INS procedures and the ‘probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;’ and, (3) the government’s 
interest involved and the burdens imposed by ‘supplemental or substitute procedures.
96
 The court 
asserted that a UAC possesses ‘substantial constitutional and statutory rights’ despite illegally 
entering the country.
97
 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), an alien has the the rights to an evidentiary 
hearing, notice, counsel (at no expense to the government), present evidence, cross-examine 
witnesses, and to a ‘decision based upon substantial evidence’.
98
 A UAC has a right to a 
deportation hearing, which is waived upon signing the voluntary departure form. When the UAC 
waives the right to a deportation hearing, he or she ‘effectively waives the right to various forms 
of relief from deportation’, including: (1) adjustment of status;
99





 or withholding of deportation;
102
 and (4) deferred action status.
103
 
Plaintiffs ‘do not possess rights equivalent to those of criminal defendants’ because ‘deportation 
proceedings are civil in nature’.
104





 and the right to appointed counsel.
107
 
   The court asserted that ‘the risk of erroneous deprivation is great’ especially for UAC 
who are ‘not arrested near the border’ or are not permanent residents of Mexico or Canada.
108
 
The INS procedures on voluntary departure are ‘inherently coercive’ and did not result in 
                                                           
96
Mathews (n57) 335; Perez-Funez (n92) 659. 
97
Mathews v. Diaz 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Perez-Funez (n92) 659. 
98
Perez-Funez (n92) 660. 
99
8 U.S.C. § 1254. 
100
8 U.S.C. § 1254. 
101
8 U.S.C. § 1158. 
102
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) 
103
Perez-Funez (n92) 660. 
104




Trias-Hernandez v. INS 528 F.2d 366 (9th Cir.1975). 
107
Martin-Mendoza v. INS 499 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1974). 
108
Perez-Funez (n92) 663. 
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‘effective waivers’ because the UAC did not understand their rights when they signed the 
voluntary departure form.
109
 A waiver is ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right or privilege’.
110
 A valid waiver of any right requires that the person ‘fully 
understands the right’ and ‘voluntarily intends to relinquish it’.
111
 Here, the plaintiffs did not 
understand the forms and their contents. Their ages, the ‘stressful situation’, the ‘new and 
complex’ environment and laws, and the ‘foreign and authoritarian’ interrogators made the entire 
process ‘inherently coercive’.
112
   
The court then considered the ‘probable value of additional or substitute safeguards in 
minimizing the aforementioned risk of deprivation’.
113
 The court surmised that ‘access to 
telephones prior to presentation of the voluntary departure form’ is the ‘only way to ensure a 
knowing waiver of rights’.
114
 Although legal counsel is the ‘best insurance against a deprivation 
of rights’, case law forecloses the right of UAC to appointed counsel at government expense.
115
 
Other alternatives to legal counsel include providing the UAC with the oportunity to contact a 
parent, close adult relative, or adult friend.
116
 The district court held that these additional 
safeguards are not ‘unduly burdensome’ on the government and issued a permanent injunction 
with the following conditions: (1) INS shall provide all UAC with an updated free legal services 
list and a simplified rights advisal approved by the court; (2) before presenting the voluntary 
departure form, INS shall provide all UAC apprehended near the U.S. borders and who reside 
permanently in Mexico or Canada ‘the opportunity to make a telephone call to a parent, close 
relative, or friend, or to an organization…on the free legal services list;’ (3) before presenting the 




Johnson v. Zerbs 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
111
Edwards v. Arizona 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Perez-Funez (n92). 
112
Perez-Funez (n92) 662.  
113
Mathews (n57) 335. 
114
Perez-Funez (n92) 664. 
115
Martin-Mendoza v. INS (n107) 922; Perez-Funez (n92) 665. 
116
Eddings v. Oklahoma 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).   
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voluntary departure form to all other UAC not apprehended at a U.S. border, INS shall provide 
and ensure that they have access to telephones and actually communicated with a ‘parent, close 
adult relative, friend, or with an organization found on the free legal services list;’ (4) INS shall 
obtain a ‘signed acknowledgment’ on a ‘separate copy of the simplified rights advisal’ showing 
that the INS provided the UAC with all required notices and information; and, (5) the district 
director shall update and maintain the free legal services list.
117
 
3.3 Issues concerning asylum applications 
3.3.1 Right of third parties to custody of the unaccompanied alien child 
An asylum application cannot be filed by a six-year-old unaccompanied minor or his relative 
who does not have legal custody, if the parent of the UAC opposes the application.
118
 Third 
parties who are not related to the UAC cannot gain custody of the minor or be appointed as 
custodians by a state juvenile court without the consent of the Secretary of the DHS.
119
  
3.3.2 Minority age at the time of the application for asylum 
The TVPRA exempts UAC from the one-year time limitation for filing an asylum application.
120
 
To qualify for the TVPRA’s jurisdictional provision, the applicants must qualify as UAC at the 
time they file an asylum application even if he or she turned eighteen years old thereafter.
121
 
Minors who do not qualify as UAC upon filing of the asylum application were ‘not statutorily 
exempted’ from the one-year time limit.
122
  
3.3.3 Right to request consent for a state juvenile court’s jurisdiction 
The DHS and not the ORR has authority to grant a UAC’s request for consent to a state juvenile 
                                                           
117
Perez-Funez (n92) 670. 
118
Gonzalez v. Reno 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000).   
119
United States ex rel. K.E.R.G. v. Burwell 2014 WL 12638877 (E.D. Pennsylvania 2014). 
120
Flores-Lobo v. Holder 562 Fed.Appx. 262 (5th Cir. 2014). 
121
United States Customs and Immigration Services, ‘Memorandum 2’ (25 March 2009) 
<http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2009,0327-unaccompanied.pdf> accessed 2 February 2018; Xin Yu He 
v. Lynch 610 Fed.Appx. 655 (9th Cir. 2015). 
122
Flores-Lobo (n120) 263. 
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 The case of F.L. v. Thompson involved a seventeen-year old Tanzanian 
UAC who was transferred to the custody of the INS and placed with a Michigan foster family.
124
 
He planned to request a Michigan juvenile court for a declaration of dependency that would 
allow him to apply for a special immigrant juvenile (‘SIJ’) visa to prevent his deportation. Since 
he was in government custody, the law required him to first obtain the U.S. Attorney General’s 
consent to the jurisdiction of the Michigan juvenile court before filing the petition for a 
declaration of dependency (‘jurisdictional consent’).
125
 Plaintiff requested the ORR to grant 
jurisdictional consent. ORR declined, instead transferring his request to DHS. The District Court 
for the District of Columbia held that under the HSA, the DHS and not the ORR has authority to 
grant or deny the UAC’s request.  
The district court traced the background of the SIJ immigration status to the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (‘INA’) (1997).  Under Section 1101(a)(27)(J) of the INA (1997), 
acquisition of a declaration of dependency from a state court is a prerequisite to applying for an 
SIJ visa, available to certain unmarried aliens under the age of twenty-one. The law defines SIJs 
as unaccompanied minors determined by state courts to be eligible for ‘long-term foster care due 
to abuse, neglect or abandonment suffered in their home countries’ when family unification is 
not possible and return to their home country is not in their best interest.
126
 The statute allowed a 
state court to assume jurisdiction over a juvenile immigrant under INS custody.
127
 In 1997, 




                                                           
123




Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), H.R. 2580; Pub.L. 89–236, 79 Stat. 911 (1997). 
126
F.L. (n123) 89. 
127
F.L. (n123); M.B. v. Quarantillo 301 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2002). 
128
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The HSA (2002) abolished the INS and divided the responsibilities for UAC between the 
DHS and ORR— specific juvenile care responsibilities were transferred to the ORR while 
authority to adjudicate immigration benefits (e.g., SIJ visas) were vested in the DHS.
129
 
Jurisdictional consent is the ‘first step of the three-step process’ that a minor must follow to 
obtain an SIJ visa.
130
 Consent and SIJ status are also in the same section of the statute providing 
for ‘other immigration benefits’—a responsibility of the DHS.
131
 The court then also analyzed 
the legislative purpose for granting the consent authority to the Attorney General. The legislative 
history of the 1997 INA amendment indicates that the Attorney General’s consent ‘was imposed 
as a precondition to juvenile court jurisdiction’ to ensure that SIJ applicants ‘have a special need 
to remain in the United States’ and ‘do not use the process simply to gain an immigration 
benefit’.
132
 Since the DHS decides whether to grant or deny SIJ status, it is ‘logical to have DHS 
exercise control over the preliminary consent stage’.
133
  
The Third Circuit reiterated that the INS (now the DHS) has broad discretion to allow or 
deny consent to a state court’s jurisdiction in a dependency hearing to grant SIJ status.
134
 In 
Yeboah v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, the INS denied a 10-year old Ghanaian UAC request for consent 
to a state court’s jurisdiction to declare him a dependent for purposes of obtaining SIJ status.
135
 
The INS ruled that the minor: (1) was not entitled to SIJ status because he was not abused, 
neglected, or abandoned; and, (2) was seeking SIJ status for the ‘improper purpose of obtaining 
permanent resident status’—he was placed on the plane by his father ‘as part of an unworkable 
                                                           
129
Homeland Security Act Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).  
130








Yeboah v. U.S. Dept. of Justice 2003; M.B. (n127). 
135
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long-term scheme’ to secure United States citizenship for him, his father, and brother.
136
 The 
Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision due to the ‘long-standing practice of allowing 
the District Director broad discretion in immigration matters’.
137
 
3.4 Issues concerning removal proceedings 
3.4.1 Right to counsel at government expense 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had the opportunity to consider whether UAC have 
the right to counsel at government expense in removal proceedings in J.E.F.M. v. Lynch.
138
 The 
Ninth Circuit, however, only considered the jurisdictional issue and declined to decide the case 
on the merits. Here, UAC aged 3 to 17 years old filed an action alleging that they were statutorily 
and constitutionally entitled to have government-appointed counsel ‘at government expense’ 
during removal proceedings.
139
 The Ninth Circuit held that a district court does not have 
jurisdiction over a claim that UAC have a right to government-appointed counsel in removal 
proceedings. Plaintiff minors ‘cannot bypass the immigration courts and proceed directly to [the] 
district court’.
140
 They must ‘exhaust the administrative process’ before accessing the federal 
courts.
141
 Congress expressly provided that all claims, statutory or constitutional, ‘arising from’ 
immigration removal proceedings ‘can only be brought through the petition for review process in 
the federal courts of appeals’.
142
 Right-to-counsel claims are ‘routinely raised in petitions for 
review filed with a federal court of appeals’.
143
 Federal courts of appeals could review only the 
                                                           
136
Yeboah (n134) 219-222. 
137
Jay v. Boyd 351 U.S. 345, 351-352 (1956); Yeboah (n134) 224. 
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Alvarado v. Holder 759 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2014); Barron v. Ashcroft 358 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2004); J.E.F.M. 
(n138); Ram v. Mukasey 529 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2008); Sola v. Holder 720 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2013); Zepeda-
Melendez v. INS 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1984). 
Page 23 of 34
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijrl

































































‘final removal order’ of an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals.
144
 
The Ninth Circuit continued that immigration judges ‘have an obligation to ask whether a 
petitioner wants counsel’.
145
 Although immigration judges are not required to ‘undertake 
Herculean efforts’ to grant petitioners the right to counsel, ‘at a minimum’ they must determine: 
(1) whether the petitioner wants counsel; (2) a reasonable period for obtaining counsel; and, (3) 
assess the voluntariness of any waiver.
146
 The Ninth Circuit stated that the failure of an 




In Nehimaya-Guerra v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit held that the minor was denied due 
process during the removal proceeding: (1) when the immigration judge conducted a group 
hearing of fifteen individuals and did not inquire as to plaintiff’s status as a minor; and, (2) when 
plaintiff admitted removability because she was not represented by an adult or legal counsel.
148
 
The Department of Justice (‘DOJ’) guidelines require ‘special treatment’ of a UAC and prohibit 
immigration judges from accepting ‘an admission of removability’ from UAC who are not 
accompanied by an ‘attorney or legal representative, a near relative, legal guardian, or friend’.
149
 
3.4.1 Right to a bond rehearing upon rearrest on allegations of gang membership 
In Saravia v. Sessions, the District Court for the Northern District of California issued a 
preliminary injunction requiring the government to grant a hearing before an immigration judge 
to any UAC previously placed with a sponsor but rearrested on allegations of gang activity.
150
 In 
this case, ICE agents implementing ‘Operation Matador’ targeted undocumented immigrants in 
                                                           
144
J.E.F.M. (n138) 1034. 
145
J.E.F.M. (n138) 1033. 
146
Biwot v. Gonzales 403 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2005); J.E.F.M. (n138); United States v. Cisneros-Rodriguez 813 F.3d 
748 (9th Cir. 2015). 
147
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two New York counties (Suffolk and Nassau) allegedly connected to criminal gangs.
151
 ICE 
agents rearrested plaintiffs due to allegations of gang involvement from local law enforcement. 
Plaintiffs were previously arrested as unaccompanied minors, transferred to ORR custody, and 
released to either parents or sponsors because of the ORR’s prior determination that they were 
not dangerous. Upon rearrest by ICE on suspicion of gang affiliation, they were placed in 
juvenile detention facilities, the most restrictive secure facility level. The district court required 
the government ‘(g)oing forward, at least while this lawsuit is pending’ to provide the plaintiffs 
with notice of the basis for rearrest and an opportunity to rebut evidence in ‘a hearing within 
seven days of arrest of any such minor’.
152
 Venue for the hearing must be ‘in the jurisdiction 
where the minor has been arrested or where the minor lives’.
153
 
The court noted that federal agents have been arresting noncitizens, including UAC 
previously placed with sponsors, ‘based on allegations of gang involvement’.
154
 Adult aliens may 
be released on bond or parole pending removal proceedings as long as the federal government 
determines that they do not pose a danger to the community or are not a flight risk. Once 
released on bond, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting the alien ‘merely because he 
is subject to removal proceedings’.
155
 The government must ‘present evidence of materially 
changed circumstances’ that the alien ‘is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk, or is now 
subject to a final order of removal’.
156
 The alien is entitled under federal laws and current DHS 
policies ‘to a prompt hearing before an immigration judge’ to dispute the notion that ‘changed 
circumstances justify his rearrest’.
157
 The court commiserated that UAC do not receive the same 
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protections as alien adults released on bond because they are not given a ‘prompt hearing’ to 
dispute that their detention is justified ‘based on changed circumstances’.
158
 The government 
instead transferred the minors to high-security facilities for an indefinite period. 
  The court then applied the Mathews v. Eldridge standard to determine the due process 
requirements in the case.
159
 Here, the plaintiffs have a ‘strong interest’ under the Fifth 
Amendment due process clause ‘in being free from unnecessary government interference with 
their liberty’.
160
 Since some of the plaintiff UAC were in the custody of their parents when they 
were rearrested and transferred to detention facilities, the government’s actions triggered the 
‘long-recognized interest’ of a parent in ‘the companionship, care, custody and management of 
his or her children’.
161
 UAC previously placed by the ORR with a sponsor cannot be rearrested 
‘solely on the ground that he is subject to removal proceedings’.
162
 A lawful arrest must be based 
on evidence of changed circumstances, indicating that the UAC pose a danger to self or the 
community or present a flight risk. The UAC and their sponsors ‘have the right to participate in a 
prompt hearing before an immigration judge’ to contest the government’s allegation of ‘changed 
circumstances’.
163
 The court stated that the government violated the due process rights of the 
UAC by indefinitely detaining then in high-security facilities without providing them a hearing.  
Without ‘a prompt adversarial hearing’, there is a ‘serious risk’ that minors previously 
placed by ORR with sponsors will be rearrested based on ‘insufficiently substantial allegations 
of gang affiliation’ and ‘erroneously placed into ORR custody’.
164
 The Ninth Circuit recognized 
that the determination of active gang membership ‘presents a considerable risk of error’ due to 
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160
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161
Berman (n56) 983; D.B. (n10) 740; Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Saravia (n150) 15. 
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the ‘informal structure of gangs, the often fleeting nature of gang membership, and the lack of 
objective criteria in making the assessment’.
165
 These additional protections do not ‘impose any 
significant burden on the federal government’ because: (1) there is already a similar process for 
adult noncitizens rearrested after release on bond; (2) the safeguards will enhance the 
government’s capacity to act in the UAC’s best interest by placing him or her ‘in the least 
restrictive setting;’ and, (3) these protections will reduce the risk that a UAC ‘is erroneously 




3.5 Issues concerning detention in facilities 
3.5.1 Legal standard for abuses experienced in facilities 
The Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan
167
 prescribed the legal standard of deliberate 
indifference to determine whether a government official’s ‘episodic act or omission’ violated 
plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment due process right to protection from harm.
168
 A government official 
is liable if he or she: (1) had ‘subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of harm’ to the plaintiff 
(‘subjective awareness’); and, (2) did not respond in an ‘objectively reasonable’ manner ‘in light 
of clearly established law’ (‘objectively reasonable response’).
169
 To prove subjective awareness, 
defendant officials must have ‘actual notice of an existing risk’ or must have inferred the obvious 
risk based on facts known to him, including circumstantial evidence.
170
  Defendant officials who 
had subjective awareness may be found liable only if did not respond in an ‘objectively 
                                                           
165
Vasquez v. Rackauckas 734 F.3d 1025, 1046 (9th Cir. 2013).  
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Saravia (n150) 19. 
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Farmer v. Brennan 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
168
E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez 600 Fed.Appx. 205, 210 (5th Cir. 2015); Hare v. City of Corinth Miss. 74 F.3d 633, 647 (5th 
Cir.1996). 
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170
Farmer (n167) 837. 
Page 27 of 34
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijrl

































































reasonable manner even if the harm ultimately was not averted’.
171
 The government may raise 
the defense of ‘qualified immunity from monetary damages’ against claims of deliberate 
indifference.
172
 The defense of qualified immunity requires a two-step analysis: (1) whether 
defendants violated a ‘clearly established right’ of the plainfiff; and, (2) whether defendants’ 




The Fifth Circuit applied the deliberate indifference standard in E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 
involving eleven unaccompanied Central American minors arrested by Texas Border Patrol 
agents and placed by the ORR in a Nixon, Texas detention facility pending immigration 
proceedings.
174
 They filed an action against defendant ORR officials in their individual 
capacities under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics
175
 
(‘Bivens action’), claiming monetary damages for violation of their constitutional rights.
176
 They 
alleged that they were physically or sexually abused while detained in the Nixon facility.   
The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that defendants were deliberately 
indifferent to their Fifth Amendment due process rights to be protected from harm because 
defendants did not have ‘subjective awareness of the risk’— they did not have ‘actual 
knowledge’ or the risk was not obvious.
177
 In Farmer v. Brennan, U.S. Supreme Court explained 
that a risk ‘may be obvious’ when inmate attacks were ‘longstanding, pervasive, well-
documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past’.
178
 Here, there was no pattern of 
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Doe v. Robertson 751 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2014); E.A.F.F. (n168) 209. 
173
E.A.F.F. (n168) 209; Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. 380 F.3d 872, 




Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
176
Brown v. Nationsbank Corp. 188 F.3d 579 (5th Cir.1999). 
177
E.A.F.F. (n168) 205). 
178
Farmer (n167) 842. 
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abuse that made the risk obvious to the defendant officials because there was ‘only one 
confirmed case of sexual abuse and one confirmed case of physical abuse’ which led to the 
suspension or termination of the perpetrators.
179
 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the government 
officials were entitled to qualified immunity because they responded reasonably to the perceived 
risk. Upon learning of the isolated incidents, defendants implemented policies to ensure more 
frequent monitoring of staff and preventing staff from entering bathrooms and bedrooms without 
an escort, reviewed staffing procedures, and scheduled additional staff training.
180
  
3.6 Other legal rights while in United States’ territory 
3.6.1 Right to terminate pregnancy 
A recent case involved the right of a UAC to terminate her pregnancy while in custody of the 
ORR. In Garza v. Hargan, plaintiff filed a petition for a temporary restraining order to prevent 
the government from interfering with her access to abortion counseling and right to abortion.
181
 
The district court granted the injunction. On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court ‘en 
banc’ denied the government’s emergency motion for stay pending appeal and remanded to the 
district court for ‘further proceedings to amend the effective dates of its injunction’.
182
 In a 
concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Millett noted that plaintiff, ‘like other minors in the United 
States who satisfy state-approved procedures’, is entitled under binding Supreme Court 
precedent to choose to terminate her pregnancy.
183
 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment ‘fully protects’ plaintiffs’ right to decide whether to continue or terminate 
pregnancy.
184
 Her status as an unaccompanied alien child does not reduce or eliminate her 
                                                           
179
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constitutional right to an abortion in compliance with state law requirements.
185
  
The government argued that the plaintiff ‘has the burden of extracting herself’ from the 
ORR’s custody if she ‘wants to exercise the right to an abortion’.
186
 According to the 
government, a UAC may obtain an abortion only if: (1) she finds a sponsor willing to and legally 
qualified to obtain custody of her; or (2) she voluntarily returns to her home country. The 
concurring opinion countered that this position is untenable because under U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent, the government may not impose ‘substantial and unjustified obstacles’ to a woman’s 





The legal issues surrounding UAC are multiple and complex.  The main legal issues addressed in 
this article cover the entire terrain of UAC apprehension, placement with a qualified sponsor or 
institution, detention, and departure. Federal court jurisprudence in the United States addressed 
issues relating to the release and detention of UAC, including the right to be released to a private 
custodian, the right to due process in custody and placement decisions, and the right to a bond 
hearing under the Flores settlement. According to the U.S. federal courts, an unaccompanied 
minor does not have a fundamental right to be released to a private individual who is not his or 
her parent or legal custodian. On the other hand, both the parents of an unaccompanied minor 
and the minor have the fundamental right to family reunification. The decision of the 
government to withhold the minor from the custody of the parent should comply with due 
process. The minor and his or her parents should be granted notice and hearing to present 






ibid. 737; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt 136 S.Ct. 2292 (2016).   
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evidence on the feasibility of family reunification and release of the minor to the parent’s 
custody.   
Case law examining the rights of UAC prior to voluntary departure emphasize the need to 
grant them the opportunity to consult with a responsible adult, including a lawyer from a free 
legal services list that should be provided to them. Also, the minor must be aware of and 
understand the consequences of voluntary departure prior to signing the voluntary departure 
form. The minor, for instance, must be aware that upon availing of voluntary departure, he or she 
waives the right to deportation hearing. Waiver of these rights must be knowing and intentional.  
Federal courts have also tackled issues concerning asylum claims filed by UAC. These 
include the right of third parties to custody of the unaccompanied minor, the minority age at the 
time of the asylum application, and the right of the UAC to request consent for a state juvenile 
court’s jurisdiction.  In removal proceedings against UAC, federal courts have elaborated on the 
scope and meaning of the right to counsel and the right to a bond rehearing upon their rearrest 
because of allegations of gang membership.  Finally, federal courts have also examined issues 
concerning the detention of UAC in ORR facilities. In particular, precedent applied the Farmer 
v. Brennan legal standard of deliberate indifference to determine whether or not detention 
officials and the administrators who operate the facilities can be made liable for abuses 
experienced by UAC. In another case, a federal court clearly granted an unaccompanied minor 
who had complied with all state laws on abortion, the right to terminate her pregnancy.   
Our primary methodology in this article was a case analysis of all relevant cases. The 
article utilized inductive doctrinal analysis to identify, categorize, and analyze pertinent legal 
issues decided at various stages of immigration enforcement against UAC.  This approach allows 
us to understand how federal courts have interpreted and expanded the rights of UAC but it is 
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limited in understanding the political and ethical questions associated with U.S. policy on UAC 
and U.S. immigration policy more generally.  Further research on UAC should expand our 
understanding of the political and ethical dimensions of U.S. policy towards unaccompanied 
alien children.  
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